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T he canonical model for studying the impact of immigration is a partial equi-librium model that combines one or various types of labor with capital in a constant-returns-to-scale production function (for an early example, see 
Altonji and Card 1991). The implications of this model for how immigration affects 
wages and employment are straightforward and intuitive. An expansion of a certain 
type of labor will lead to a decrease in the wage of native labor of the same type, 
in absolute terms and relative to other types of labor—as well as an increase in the 
marginal productivity of capital. This model has led to the common view of immigra-
tion being potentially harmful for individuals whose skills are most similar to those of 
immigrants, but possibly beneficial for those whose skills are different. However, when 
this canonical model is implemented through empirical models, some studies using 
this approach find a sizeable effect of immigration on wages of native workers, while 
others do not. For instance, while Card (2009) finds that immigration to the United 
States has only a minor effect on native wages, Borjas (2003) provides evidence for 
wages of natives being harmed by immigration, and Ottaviani and Peri (2012) report 
positive wage effects on natives. One reaction to these apparently contradictory find-
ings has been to expand the theoretical framework in various ways. For example, one 
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approach is to acknowledge the multiple output nature of an economy, thus adding 
possibilities of adjustment to immigration along the product mix and technology 
margins (for example, Card and Lewis 2007; Lewis 2011; Dustmann and Glitz 2015). 
Another theoretical alternative is to allow the price of the output good to vary, rather 
than being fixed (for example, Özden and Wagner 2015).  
Such alternative theories are worth exploring for their own sake, but we do not 
believe that they are necessary for explaining the differing findings from empirical 
studies of how immigration affects wages. We argue here that the often contradic-
tory results in the empirical literature have two important sources. First, despite 
being derived from the same canonical model, different empirical specifications 
measure different parameters. Second, two assumptions that are commonly and 
tacitly made when bringing this framework to the data may be invalid: 1) that the 
labor supply elasticity is homogenous across different groups of natives; and 2) that 
we can place immigrants and natives into education-experience cells within which 
they compete in the labor market, based on their reported education and age. 
In the next section, we classify existing empirical specifications into three groups. 
One specification, as for example in Borjas (2003), exploits variation in immigrant 
inflows across education-experience cells on a national level (or a “national skill-
cell approach”). Another specification, as for example in Altonji and Card (1991), 
uses variation in the total immigrant flow across regions (a “pure spatial approach”). 
A third specification, as for example in Card (2001), uses variation in immigrant 
inflows both across education groups and across regions (a  “mixture approach”). As 
we illustrate in Table 1, the national skill-cell approach tends to produce more nega-
tive wage effects for natives in response to immigration than the mixture approach, 
while estimates obtained from the pure spatial approach vary widely depending on 
which skill group is studied. However, as we argue below, estimates obtained from the 
different models are not comparable, answer different questions, and have different 
interpretations. While the national skill-cell and the mixture approach identify a 
relative wage effect of immigration—of one experience group versus another within 
education groups and of one education group versus another—the pure spatial 
approach recovers the total wage effect of immigration on a particular native skill 
group that takes into account complementarities across skill cells and across labor 
and capital. We illustrate that the different specifications are motivated by variants of 
the same canonical model but estimate different structural parameters. 
We then turn to two extensions. First, research in this area typically assumes 
that the elasticity of labor supply is homogenous across different groups of natives 
(with many papers implicitly postulating a vertical labor supply curve). This assump-
tion allows focusing the analysis on wages and ignoring employment responses. 
However, if the employment of natives responds to immigration, part of its overall 
impact on the labor market will be absorbed by employment as opposed to wage 
responses. Moreover, not only is labor supply likely to be elastic, but it is also likely to 
differ across groups of native workers (such as skilled and unskilled, or younger and 
older workers). We illustrate that with group-specific labor supply elasticities, the 
national skill-cell approach may produce estimates that are hard to interpret, while 
Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönberg, and Jan Stuhler     33
approaches that estimate total effects still produce estimates that have a clear inter-
pretation. Furthermore, the degree to which the labor supply response of natives 
differs across groups, as well as its overall level, depend on the variation the chosen 
approach uses for identification. When using variation across skill-experience cells 
on the national level, employment adjusts only at the un- and non-employment 
margin. In contrast, when using variation across local labor markets, as in the pure 
spatial or mixture approach, the labor supply of natives may respond more elasti-
cally, due to the regional migration of workers.
Second, the national skill-cell and the mixture approach rely on the assumption 
that an immigrant and a native with the same measured education and experience 
compete against each other. However, there is strong empirical evidence that 
immigrants “downgrade” upon arrival, and we demonstrate the downgrading 
of immigrants for three countries: the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Consequently, assigning immigrants to skill groups according to their measured 
skills may lead to misclassification, and seriously impair the estimates of wage 
responses of natives to immigration. Although the bias cannot be unambiguously 
signed, we provide evidence suggesting that in the US context, downgrading may 
overstate the negative impact of immigration in both the national skill-cell and the 
mixture approach, but particularly so in the national skill-cell approach.  Down- 
grading may therefore be one reason why the national skill-cell approach 
tends to produce more negative native wage effects than the mixture approach. In 
contrast, approaches that estimate total effects of immigration are robust to down-
grading as they do not require the allocation of immigrants into skill groups. 
In a final step, we turn to approaches that explicitly estimate the underlying 
parameters of the canonical model above and then use that model to predict the 
wage effects of immigration, as in for example Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and 
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012). We contend that downgrading may 
seriously impair the estimation of a key parameter in this approach, the elasticity of 
substitution between immigrants and natives, which may help to explain why studies 
using this approach find often positive wage effects of immigration for natives.
In summary, we argue that differences in coefficients estimated by the different 
specifications, and the assumptions being made about native labor supply responses 
and downgrading may explain many of the apparent contradictions among the 
empirical findings reported in the literature. We advocate investigating the effects 
of the overall (as opposed to the group-specific) immigration shock on wages and 
employment of various native groups. This procedure avoids the pre-classification 
of workers into groups and is therefore immune to the misclassification of immi-
grants that arises due to the “downgrading” phenomenon. Further, it estimates a 
parameter that is of direct policy relevance and easily interpretable, even if labor 
supply elasticities differ across groups of native workers. 
We should emphasize that this paper is about the correct specification of 
empirical models and the interpretation of the estimated parameters, not about 
empirical identification. Any of the approaches we discuss slices the labor market 
into different sub-labor-markets and uses variation in the inflow of immigrants into 
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these sub-labor-markets as an identification device. We assume here that the allo-
cation of immigrants to these sub-labor-markets is (conditionally) independent of 
shocks to wages or employment of native workers (which could be achieved either 
through random allocation of immigrants, or by use of an appropriate instrument), 
and that some, but not other sub-labor-markets are exposed to an inflow of immi-
grants.1 Throughout the paper, we explain our arguments informally and verbally. 
We have prepared a self-contained companion appendix to this paper, available 
online with this paper at http://e-jep.org, which provides formal derivations and 
technical discussion. 
Estimation Approaches Used in the Literature
The existing empirical literature has derived three conceptually different effects 
of immigration on wages, estimated using different types of variation for identifica-
tion: 1) estimation at the national level exploiting variation in the skill-cell-specific 
inflow of immigrants, as pioneered by Borjas (2003); 2) estimation at the regional 
level exploiting variation in the total inflow of immigrants, as pioneered by Altonji 
and Card (1991); and 3) estimation at the regional level exploiting variation in the 
inflow of immigrants both across areas and skill cells, as for instance in Card (2001). 
These different empirical approaches identify conceptually different parameters 
that are not directly comparable—even if the estimation regressions are motivated 
by the same canonical model (or versions of that model). 
The National Skill-Cell Approach: Variation in the Immigration Shock across Skill 
Cells
Borjas (2003) estimates the wage effects of immigration at the national level 
by categorizing immigrants and natives into education-experience cells using data 
from various census waves. This method identifies the relative wage effect of immi-
gration by experience. To see this, we rewrite his baseline estimation equation (see 
equation 3 in his paper) as a first difference equation to obtain:2
  Δ log  w gat =  θ skill Δ  p gat + Δ  π t +  ( s g × Δ  π t ) +  ( x a × Δ  π t ) + Δ  φ gat  
1 The identification of empirical models is a key problem in the literature. Studies that slice the labor 
market into spatial units typically rely on using past settlement of immigrants as an instrumental vari-
able, as used in Altonji and Card (1991) and further developed in Card (2001). Studies that slice 
the labor market into skill groups instead typically assume that immigrant inflows are exogenous, an 
assumption that may be violated (Llull 2014). A number of studies exploit natural quasi-experiments 
that lead to a sharp rise or fall in immigration for identification purposes, such as Card (1990), Hunt 
(1992), Carrington and De Lima (1996), Friedberg (2001), Glitz (2012), Dustmann, Schönberg, and 
Stuhler (2016), and Foged and Peri (2016). Moreover, “push factors” that generate out-migration can 
be combined with the past settlement instrument (for example, Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor 2010; 
Ganguli 2015; Aydemir and Kirdar 2013; Monras 2015a).
2 We have swapped the sub-indices i and j used by Borjas to denote education and experience cells with 
the sub-indices g and a used by us in the next section.
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where  Δ log  w gat denotes the change in native wage (in logs) in education group g, 
experience group a at time t, and  Δ  p gat denotes the education-experience specific 
immigration shock, defined as the difference in the ratio of immigrants to all labor 
in each education-experience group  ga between two time periods. The variables  s g ,   
x a ,   and  π t are vectors of education, experience, and time fixed effects. In the case 
of two education and experience groups, the parameter  θ skill may be thought of 
as a triple difference estimator where differences are taken over time, experience 
groups, and education groups. The inclusion of time fixed effects in first differences   
absorbs the overall immigration shock—any effects of immigration common to all 
education and experience groups are therefore differenced out. The education-time 
fixed effects capture, in addition to differential time trends by education unrelated 
to immigration, differences in immigration shocks across education groups. Any 
effects of immigration common to all experience groups within education groups 
are therefore likewise differenced out. The inclusion of experience-time fixed 
effects, in turn, soaks up the experience-specific immigration shock, in addition to 
allowing for differential time trends by experience unrelated to immigration. The 
parameter  θ skill therefore identifies the relative effect of immigration by experience 
and answers the question: “How does immigration affect native wages of experi-
enced relative to inexperienced workers in the same education group?” Since the 
effects of immigration that are common to the education group are differenced out, 
this parameter is not informative about the distributional effects between education 
groups, nor about its absolute effects. The upper panel of Table 1 provides an over-
view of some of the papers adopting the national skill-cell approach. Typical wage 
estimates for native men are around –0.5 (for example, Borjas 2003; Aydemir and 
Borjas 2007; Borjas 2014). Estimates turn substantially more negative when using 
instrumental variables to adjust for the potential endogeneity of the immigration 
shock across education-experience cells (Llull 2014). In contrast, using an alterna-
tive measure for the education-experience specific immigration shock, Card and 
Peri (2016) report a smaller estimate of –0.1.
The Pure Spatial Approach: Variation in the Total Immigration Shock across Regions
In many studies that exploit spatial variation in immigrant inflows, the log 
wage changes of natives in education group g and experience group a in region 
r are related to the total region-specific immigration shock (defined as the ratio of 
all immigrants entering the region and all natives in that region), controlling for 
nation-wide education-experience specific time trends ( s ga × Δ  π t ) :
  Δlog  w gart =  θ ga spatial Δ  p rt +  s ga × Δ  π t + Δ  φ gart .
In the case of two time periods and two regions A and B, the parameter  θ ga spatial equals 
a difference-in-difference estimator where differences are taken over time and across 
regions. Provided that region B, otherwise identical to region A, did not experience 
an inflow of immigrants and is not indirectly affected by the immigration shock in 
region A (for example, through outmigration of natives), this parameter identifies the 
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total effect of immigration on wages of a particular skill group. It answers the question 
“What is the overall effect of immigration on native wages of a particular education-
experience group?” It is informative about the distributional effects of immigration 
both between education and experience groups, as well as about its absolute effects. 
The second panel of Table 1 provides an overview of some papers that adopt the pure 
spatial approach. For example, Altonji and Card (1991) report total wage estimates 
for white male high school dropouts of about –1.1, while Dustmann, Frattini, and 
Preston (2013) find negative total wage effects of about –0.5 at the 10th percentile, 
and positive wage effects of 0.4 at the 90th of the earnings distribution. Card (2007) 
finds small positive total wage effects (0.06) for natives on average. 
The Mixture Approach: Variation in the Immigration Shock across Both Skill-Cells 
and Regions
A third set of papers exploits variation in the immigration shock across both 
skill-cells and regions, and are therefore a mixture of the pure skill-cell approach 
and the pure spatial approach. Most papers that fall into this category distinguish 
only between education (or occupation) cells. These papers then relate the wage 
change of natives in education group g and region r to the education-specific immi-
gration shock in that region  (Δ  p grt ) , controlling for education- and region-specific 
time trends ( s g   ×  Δ  π t and  s r   ×  Δ  π t ):
   Δ log  w grt =  θ spatial,skill Δ  p grt +  ( s r   ×  Δ  π t ) +  ( s g   ×  Δ  π t ) + Δ  φ grt .  
In the simple case of two regions A and B, two time periods, and two education 
groups, the parameter  θ spatial,skill can be expressed as a triple difference estimator 
where differences are taken over time, across regions, and across education groups. 
By conditioning on region-specific time effects and thus absorbing the total region-
specific immigration shock,  θ spatial,skill identifies the relative effect of immigration by 
education and answers the question: “How does immigration affect native wages of 
low-skilled relative to high-skilled workers?” Since the effects of immigration common 
to all education-experience groups are differenced out, the mixture approach is infor-
mative about the distributional effects of immigration between education groups, 
but not about its absolute effects. The third panel of Table 1 provides an overview 
of some of the papers that adopt the mixture approach. Estimates are generally less 
negative than those obtained from the national skill-cell approach. For example, 
Card (2001), who uses just one cross-section and distinguishes between occupations 
rather than education groups, reports a wage estimate of –0.1 for native men. Dust-
mann and Glitz (2015) find a more negative response in nontradable industries (not 
shown), but little response in tradable or manufacturing industries. 
In sum, depending on the definition of the immigration-induced labor supply 
shock (skill group specific or overall) and the variation in immigration shocks used 
(across skill cells, across regions, or both), the level of the analysis (for example, educa-
tion groups versus education-experience groups), and the control variables used 
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in the estimation regressions, different approaches identify conceptually different 
parameters. Although these parameters are not directly comparable, it is possible to 
transform total effects into relative effects of immigration by experience and educa-
tion. In contrast, since total effects of immigration contain additional information in 
comparison to relative effects, the latter cannot be transformed into the former. 
Interpretation of Relative and Total Effects of Immigration through 
the Lens of the Canonical Model
To aid the interpretation of the parameters estimated by the three main 
empirical approaches, we now present a simple version of the canonical model that 
motivates the empirical specifications outlined above. 
Set-Up 
Production Function. We assume a simple Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion that combines capital  K and labor  L into a single output good  Y , where 
 Y = A  L 1−α  K α . Labor is assumed to be a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggre-
gate of different education types, and we distinguish here between low- ( L L ) and 
high-skilled ( L H ) labor only, so that  L =   [ θ L  L L β +  θ H  L H β ] 1/β . The elasticity of substi-
tution between low- and high-skilled workers is given by  1 / (1 − β) , and measures 
the percentage change in the ratio of low-skilled workers to high-skilled workers in 
response to a given percentage change in the wages of low-skilled to high-skilled 
workers. The higher this elasticity, the more substitutable the two groups are. The 
two skill types are perfect substitutes (implying an infinite substitution elasticity) 
if  β = 1 . 
Within each education group, we allow, similar to Card and Lemieux (2001), 
inexperienced ( L I ) and experienced ( L E ) workers to be imperfect substitutes, 
so that  L g =  [  θ gI  L gI γ +  θ gE  L gE γ ] 1/γ , and where 1/(1 –  γ) is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between inexperienced and experienced workers within an education group. 
If  γ = 1 , the two groups are perfect substitutes. We assume here that immigrants 
can be correctly classified to education and experience groups and that within an 
education-experience group, immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes. We 
turn to the possibility of misclassification and imperfect substitutability between 
immigrants and natives below.
Firms choose capital and labor by maximizing profits, taking wage rates and the 
price of capital as given. Output prices are assumed to be determined in the world 
market and are normalized to 1.
Capital and Labor Supply. Capital is supplied to the labor market according to 
 r =  K λ , where  r  denotes the price of capital and  1 / λ is the elasticity of capital supply. 
We assume that the labor supply of immigrants who enter the country is inelastic. 
In contrast, native employment in an education-experience group depends on the 
wage in that education-experience group. Let  η ga denote the labor supply elasticity 
for a particular education-experience group. It measures the percentage change in 
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the supply of native labor in the education-experience group in response to a given 
percentage change in the wage of that group. The degree to which native labor 
supply responds to an immigration-induced labor supply shock (and the heteroge-
neity across groups) depends on the alternatives an individual has when wages in 
the current (or desired) job decline. If wages decline in the local economy, workers 
may respond by moving away (or no longer moving into the area). However, if 
wages decrease in all firms in the national economy, workers can respond only by 
moving from and into unemployment or by entering or exiting the labor force. 
Thus, when using spatial variation in immigrant inflows (as in the pure spatial and 
the mixture approach), estimated labor supply elasticities of natives are likely larger 
than when using variation across skill cells in the national labor market (as in the 
national skill-cell approach). 
Labor supply elasticities on the national level may differ between different 
groups of workers. For instance, Altonji and Blank (1999) find that married women 
have the largest labor supply elasticities on the national level, while Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (2007) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) emphasize that individuals 
near retirement or those with low wage rates exhibit particularly large extensive 
margin responses. Groups that have the weakest attachment to the labor force, such 
as single mothers, appear more elastic on the extensive margin (for example, Meyer 
and Rosenbaum 2001, Gruber and Wise 1999, Heckman 1993, Keane and Rogerson 
2015, and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber 2012 for a summary).
The labor supply elasticity at the local level captures in addition the internal 
migration of workers between areas and may thus depend on additional factors such 
as the supply of housing (Moretti 2011) and the size of the labor market that is 
considered (for example, Borjas 2006). This adjustment margin may have different 
importance for different types of workers. For example, geographic mobility may be 
a more important adjustment margin for skilled workers, as migration rates rise with 
education (Greenwood 1975; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). Indeed, Bound 
and Holzer (2000) find that skilled workers are more likely to move in response to a 
local shock, as do Wozniak (2010), Notowidigdo (2011), Amior and Manning (2015), 
and ourselves in Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016). Similarly, Cadena and 
Kovak (2016) note that location choices respond more strongly to demand shocks 
for Mexican-born immigrants than for natives. Such patterns affect the incidence of 
local shocks. For example, Hornbeck and Moretti (2015) find that because college 
graduates move in greater numbers in response to a local productivity shock, its 
incidence is reduced for skilled workers. Both the overall size of the elasticity and the 
relative importance of the underlying adjustment margins may vary across groups. 
For example, in Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016), we find that young 
workers respond more strongly at the geographic margin than older workers. 
Interpretation of Relative and Total Wage Effects of Immigration if Labor Supply 
is Inelastic
A common assumption in the literature is that native employment does not 
respond to wage changes (for example, Borjas 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2012). With 
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inelastic native labor supply, the only reason that total education- and education-
experience-specific employment change is because of immigration. In this case, the 
equilibrium native wage response due to immigration equals:
  Δ log  w ga = − αλ _____ 1 − α + λ Δ  I ̃ +  (β − 1) (Δ  I ̃ g − Δ  I ̃ ) +  (γ − 1) (Δ  I ga − Δ  I ̃ g ) ,
where  Δ  I ̃ and  Δ  I ̃ g are the overall and education-specific immigration shocks, 
measured as percentage change in efficiency units, and  Δ  I ga is the education-
experience specific immigration shock. Consider first the third term on the right 
side of the equation, and suppose that, within each education group, immigration 
is relatively inexperienced. This term is then negative for inexperienced natives, 
and positive for experienced natives. Thus, ceteris paribus, immigration will lower 
wages of inexperienced natives and raise wages of experienced natives within each 
education group.
The second term on the right side of the equation looks at how changes in 
immigration disproportionately affect education levels. The second term will be 
negative for the education group that is exposed to the larger inflow of immigrants 
and positive for the other education group, implying wage declines for the former 
and wage increases for the latter group (holding the other terms constant). Thus, 
the second and third terms summarize the key insight of the simple competitive 
model: Immigration will decrease the marginal product and hence wages of native 
workers most similar to immigrant workers, and may increase the marginal product 
and wages of native workers most dissimilar to immigrant workers.  
Finally, the first term on the right captures the wage effects of immigration 
common to all education and experience groups and can, at an intuitive level, 
be understood as the slope of the aggregate demand curve. If capital supply is 
fully elastic ( λ = 0 ), this term disappears and on average, wages do not change in 
response to immigration. If, in contrast, capital supply is not fully elastic, the direct 
overall immigration shock pulls down wages of all skill groups in the same way, and 
an immigration-induced labor supply shock has a negative effect on average wages—
as immigration will lead to increases in the rent of capital and redistribute a share 
of output from labor to capital. The literature often denotes the case of inelastic 
capital supply as the short-run effect of immigration, and the case of perfectly elastic 
labor supply as the long-run effect.
Based on this equation, it is now straightforward to provide a structural inter-
pretation of the relative and total effects of immigration identified by the three 
empirical approaches described in the previous section.
National Skill-Cell Approach. As explained above, the national skill-cell approach 
pioneered by Borjas (2003) identifies the relative wage effect of immigration by 
experience, while any effects of immigration common to all education and experi-
ence groups as well as any effects of immigration common to all experience groups 
within education groups are differenced out. Put differently, in the empirical 
specification underlying the national skill-cell approach, the total and the education-
specific immigration shocks are held constant through the inclusion of general and 
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education-specific time fixed effects. The parameter  θ skill estimated by the spatial 
skill-cell approach may therefore be thought of as the direct partial effect of immi-
gration, holding the total and the education-specific immigration shock constant. 
From the previous equation,  θ skill identifies  (γ − 1) , the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution between experienced and inexperienced workers within education 
groups. It is unambiguously negative (as  γ < 1 ), the more so the less substitutable 
experienced and inexperienced workers are within education groups.
Mixture Approach. Studies that exploit variation in the immigration shock 
across both skill-cells and regions (for example, LaLonde and Topel 1991; Card 
2009) identify the relative wage effect of immigration by education, as any effects of 
immigration common to all education groups are differenced out. The parameter 
θ spatial,skill estimated by the mixture approach may thus be thought of as the direct 
partial effect of immigration holding the total immigration shock constant. From 
an earlier equation,  θ spatial,skill identifies  (β − 1) , the inverse of the elasticity of substi-
tution between unskilled and skilled workers. This parameter is unambiguously 
negative, the more so the less substitutable low- and high-skilled workers are.
Pure Spatial Approach. The pure spatial approach adopted by, for example, 
Altonji and Card (1991) identifies the total wage effect of immigration for workers 
in education and experience group ga. The parameter  θ ga spatial in the empirical 
 equation for this approach given in the previous section corresponds to the 
change in log wages of skill group ga as response to the total immigration shock in 
head counts. 
In addition to the elasticities of substitution between inexperienced and 
experienced workers and low- and high-skilled workers, the parameter depends 
on the elasticity of capital supply and the share of capital in production. This total 
effect measures not only the direct partial effects of an immigration-induced labor 
supply shock on native workers in a particular education-experience or educa-
tion group, but also the indirect effects through complementarities across skill 
cells and across capital and labor and is, for this reason, in our view the most 
policy-relevant parameter. If capital supply is fully elastic, the total wage effect 
of immigration will be zero on average, while negative for some skill groups—
those experiencing the stronger inflow of immigrants—and positive for other skill 
groups. If capital supply is fully inelastic, the total wage effect may be negative for 
all skill groups.  
 Interpretation if Labor Supply is Elastic but Constant across Skill Groups 
So far, we have discussed the interpretation of the relative and total wage 
effects of immigration under the assumption that native labor does not respond to 
wage changes. Next, we turn to the case in which native labor supply does adjust to 
wage changes, but the labor supply elasticity is constant across skill groups. In this 
case, the labor market effects of immigration are not only absorbed through wage 
changes, but also through employment changes. Therefore, to obtain a complete 
picture of both the relative and total effects of immigration, wage and employment 
responses need to be studied jointly. As the labor supply elasticity increases, both 
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the relative and the total wage effects become more muted, whereas the respective 
employment effects increase. If labor supply is infinitely elastic, the relative and total 
wage effects of immigration approach zero, whereas the respective employment 
effects approach −1, implying that each immigrant displaces one native worker. As 
discussed, the labor supply elasticity is likely to be smaller at the national level than 
at the local level—which, as emphasized by Borjas (2003), may help to explain why 
the national skill-cell approach tends to produce more negative wage effects than 
the mixture approach.
Our discussion so far has assumed that wages are fully downward flexible. 
However, in practice, wages may be partially downward rigid at least in the short-
run, for example because of institutional constraints or contractual agreements. 
The degree of downward wage rigidity plays a similar role in determining the wage 
and employment impacts of immigration as the labor supply elasticity; the higher 
the degree of rigidity, the smaller the wage and the larger the employment response 
to immigration. Wage rigidity therefore provides an additional reason why native 
wage and employment responses need to be studied jointly to obtain an accurate 
picture of the labor market impacts of immigration. 
Under the assumption that wages are fully downward flexible, estimates of the 
labor supply elasticities can be obtained by dividing the total or relative employment 
response by the respective native wage response. It is important to emphasize that the 
ratio of wage and employment effects obtained from the pure spatial or the mixture 
approach identifies the local labor supply elasticity, while estimates obtained from 
the skill-cell approach identify a national supply elasticity. Ebert and Stone (1992) 
estimates the local labor supply elasticity to be about 5 on the US metropolitan 
statistical area level, while Bartik (1991), Lettau (1994), Smith (2012), and Notowi-
digdo (2011) provide somewhat smaller estimates in the range of 1.5 to 4. Because 
of differences in specifications, such as the time frame and size of the local area 
considered, these estimates are not fully comparable. Estimates for the national 
labor supply elasticity at the extensive margin, typically estimated using tax changes, 
tend to be smaller: the meta-analysis in Chetty et al. (2012) points to an extensive 
margin elasticity of around 0.25. Longitudinal data, which trace workers over time 
across regions, make it possible to decompose the local employment response into 
inflows from and outflows to nonemployment, and inflows from and outflows to 
employment in other regions. For instance, in Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 
(2016), we show that in the particular context, movements across regions account 
for roughly one-third of the overall local native employment response, which adjusts 
predominantly because inflows into employment in the affected region decline (for 
similar evidence, see also Filer 1992; Monras 2015b).  
Interpretation if Labor Supply Elasticities Vary across Skill Groups 
So far, we have assumed that the elasticity of labor supply is constant across 
education-experience groups. It is likely, however, that labor supply elasticities differ 
between different groups of workers, both on national and local levels (see our 
discussion above). Alternatively, the degree of wage rigidity may differ across groups 
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of workers. For example, in Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016), we argue 
that older workers’ wages may be more “protected” than those of younger workers 
and, unlike wages of younger workers, less likely to adjust downward. Next, we high-
light the implications of heterogeneity in labor supply elasticities or in the degree 
of wage rigidities across groups of workers for the interpretation of the relative and 
total effects of immigration. 
Mixture Approach. Consider first the relative effect of immigration by education 
identified by the mixture approach. A key implication of the canonical model is 
that natives who suffer the largest inflow of immigrations (for example, low-skilled 
workers if immigration is relatively low-skilled) suffer the largest decline in wages 
as well as employment. With heterogeneous labor supply elasticities, however, this 
may no longer hold—a phenomenon we refer to as “perverse” effects (see also 
Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016). To grasp the intuition for the possibility 
of perverse effects, suppose that immigration is relatively low skilled and that, in 
line with the empirical evidence that low-skilled workers respond more elastically 
to wage changes along the un- or nonemployment margin, low-skilled natives have 
a higher labor supply elasticity than high-skilled natives. In equilibrium, low-skilled 
natives’ employment will then have responded strongly relative to high-skilled 
natives’ employment, while their wages adjust less, and may even increase relative to 
those of high-skilled natives. In the presence of heterogeneous labor supply elastici-
ties, the relative wage and employment effect of immigration may therefore be of 
opposite sign. While the mixture approach continues to be informative about how 
immigration affects wages and employment of one education group relative to the 
other, focusing solely on native wage responses may yield a misleading picture of the 
overall relative effects of immigration. The possibility of perverse effects therefore 
reinforces our conclusion that wage and employment responses need to be studied 
jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the labor market impacts of immigration.
National Skill-Cell Approach. Consider next the wage and employment effects 
estimated by the national skill-cell approach ( θ skill ) , which compares wage changes 
between inexperienced and experienced low-skilled workers with those of inexperi-
enced and experienced high-skilled workers. When labor supply elasticities (or the 
degrees of wage rigidity) vary across groups, estimates obtained from this approach 
are difficult to interpret and may no longer be informative about the effects of 
immigration on experienced natives relative to inexperienced natives within educa-
tion groups. This is because the relative wage effect of one experience group versus 
the other among low-skilled workers is likely to differ from that among high-skilled 
workers. It can be shown that the triple difference estimator of  θ skill   implied by the 
first equation in the paper describing this approach aggregates the two relative wage 
effects by experience in a nonmeaningful way, as it assigns a negative weight to the 
relative effect in one education group and a weight greater than 1 to the relative 
effect in the other education group.
Pure Spatial Approach. In contrast, the total effect of immigration estimated 
by the pure spatial approach remains a meaningful and policy-relevant parameter 
even in the presence of heterogeneous labor supply elasticities, addressing the same 
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question as in the case of homogenous (or inelastic) labor supply responses: “How 
does the overall immigration shock affect wages and employment of a particular 
native education-experience group?” Estimates for the education-experience-
specific labor supply elasticities can then be obtained by dividing the estimates for 
the total native employment effect in a particular education-experience group by 
the respective estimate of the total wage effect. 
Downgrading and Misclassification
Empirical Evidence of Downgrading
“Downgrading” occurs when the position of immigrants in the labor market, 
which is typically measured by wage or occupation, is systematically lower than the 
position of natives with the same observed education and experience levels. Down-
grading means that immigrants receive lower returns to the same measured skills 
than natives when these skills are acquired in their country of origin. 
The research literature provides ample evidence on the initial downgrading of 
immigrant arrivals and their subsequent economic assimilation. As one example, for 
the case of immigration from Russia to Israel in the 1990s, the returns immigrants 
receive for their schooling and experience are initially zero or even negative, but 
rise with time spent in the host country, while immigrants with high education climb 
up the occupational ladder to move into high-skill occupations (Eckstein and Weiss 
2004). Estimates of earnings equations such as those by Chiswick (1978), Borjas 
(1985), or Dustmann (1993), among others, have long shown that immigrants’ 
earnings profiles are comparatively flat with respect to labor market experience 
or schooling acquired at home. Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) present 
evidence on immigrant downgrading for the United Kingdom, and Dustmann and 
Preston (2012) for the UK and the US economies.3
In the presence of downgrading, placement of immigrants into education or 
education-experience cells within which they compete with natives—a prerequi-
site of the skill-cell approach and the mixture approach—becomes difficult. For 
instance, a Polish surgeon who arrives in the United Kingdom may lack formal 
requirements or complementary skills such as the English language and might end 
up working as a nurse, at least initially. However, based on observed education, the 
researcher would allocate this surgeon to a skill cell further up the skill distribution. 
To illustrate the degree of downgrading of immigrants, we offer some evidence 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. We use data from the 
2000 US Census and the German IAB Employment subsample, and from the UK 
3 Indirect evidence on initial downgrading follows also from the occupational upgrading of immigrants 
upon legalization (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000) and the relation between changes in immigration 
status and native wages (Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). The issue of downgrading has also been acknowl-
edged in various papers that use the skill-cell approach, such as Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997, p. 42) 
and Borjas (2003). 
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labor force survey for the period between 1995 and 2005. In Figure 1, we show 
where recent immigrants (whom we define as immigrants who arrived over the past 
two years) are actually situated in the native wage distribution (the dashed lines 
in panels A–C), and where we would assign them if they received the same return 
to their experience and education as natives (the solid lines in panels A–C). The 
x-axis measures the percentiles of the wage distribution. The y-axis is the density 
D: Upgrading of Immigrants over Time (United States)
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Figure 1 
Downgrading of Immigrants
Source: Panel A: US Census 2000; panel B: UK Labor Force Survey 1995–2005; and panel C: IAB 
Employment Subsample 2000, year 2000.
Note: Panels A–C show where recent immigrants (whom we define as immigrants who arrived over the 
past two years) are actually situated in the native wage distribution (the dashed lines in panels A–C), 
and where we would assign them if they received the same return to their experience and education 
as natives (the solid lines in panels A–C). These panels show kernel estimates of the actual (dashed 
lines) and predicted (solid lines) density of immigrants in the native wage distribution. Panel D shows 
the difference between the actual and predicted density of immigrants. The horizontal line shows as a 
reference the native wage distribution. The kernel estimates are above the horizontal line at wages where 
immigrants are more concentrated than natives, and below the horizontal line at wages where immigrants 
are less concentrated than natives. 
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of a particular group relative to natives (horizontal line at 1). For instance, a point 
(2, 20) means that members of the group are twice as likely as natives to be located 
at the 20th percentile of the native wage distribution. The figures first illustrate 
that in all three countries, immigrants are, relative to natives with the same formal 
measurements of experience and education, overrepresented at the bottom of 
the wage distribution, and underrepresented in the middle or upper ends of the 
wage distribution. For all three countries, the dashed line (showing where immi-
grants are actually located) lies above the solid line (showing where immigrants 
should be located based on their education and experience) at low percentiles of 
the wage distribution, but it tends to be underneath the solid line further up the 
wage distribution.4 Overall, for the three countries of Germany, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom, recent immigrants have wages that are on average 17.9 
percent, 15.5 percent, and 12.9 percent below those native workers would receive 
after controlling for sex, age, education groups, and age-by-education interactions. 
The degree of downgrading may change over time and differ across groups. In the 
United Kingdom, our own calculations (not shown here) show that cohorts that 
arrived in the mid or late 1990s downgrade less strongly than those that entered in 
the mid 2000s. In Germany, immigrants arriving in 2000 from other EU countries 
do not downgrade on average, while the degree of downgrading is substantial for 
arrivals from other source countries. 
Downgrading is most severe in the years after immigrants arrive, as immigrants 
then proceed to upgrade their skills and acquire complementary skills in the host 
county. But the first years after arrival are exactly the years that matter when esti-
mating the labor market impacts of immigration. For instance, when annual data 
is used, the change in the share of immigrants is driven by those who arrived over 
the past year. We illustrate “upgrading” in Figure 1D, where we plot the difference 
between the actual position of immigrants in the native wage distribution and their 
predicted position based on observable characteristics (the dashed lines), for immi-
grants with different durations in the United States. If immigrants and natives with 
similar characteristics have similar wages, then the actual and predicted positions 
should coincide (solid line). The panel shows that these profiles indeed become 
more similar the longer immigrants are in the country. 
In the companion appendix to this paper, we propose a simple proce-
dure to impute the degree of immigrant downgrading upon arrival in each 
4 More specifically, the allocation of where immigrants should be located according to their observable 
human capital characteristics (and where the skill-cell approach as well as the structural approach we 
discuss below would allocate them) is based on a flexible log wage regression model estimated for natives. 
It includes five age categories (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65), four educational categories (three 
for Germany), and interactions between the two. We fit separate models for men and women and for 
different years, compute fitted values for immigrants, and add a normally distributed error term (based 
on the category-specific residual variance for natives) to compute their predicted rank within the native 
wage distribution. As the income rank is bounded, conventional kernel estimation with fixed window 
width would give misleading estimates at the extremes. The kernel estimates are therefore calculated 
on the log of the odds of the position in the non-immigrant distribution, as in Dustmann, Frattini, and 
Preston (2013).
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education-experience cell under the assumption that immigrants and natives 
of the same effective education-experience type are equally likely to work in a 
particular occupation-wage group. We apply this procedure to immigrant cohorts 
that entered the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany around the year 
2000. Table 2 contrasts their observed education-experience distribution with 
their effective one. In all three countries, there is considerable downgrading by 
experience: in the United States and Germany, the share of immigrants who are 
observed to be experienced is more than twice as high as the share of immigrants 
who are effectively experienced. Downgrading by education is particularly striking 
in the United Kingdom: Whereas 69.7 percent of immigrant arrivals to the United 
Kingdom would be classified as high skilled based on their reported education, 
only 24.6 percent are effectively high skilled, suggesting that far from a supply 
shock for high-skilled workers, immigrant arrivals to the United Kingdom were a 
supply shock in the market for low-skilled workers.
Table 2 
The Observed and Effective Skills of Immigrant Arrivals
A: United States (Census, year 2000)
Observed Effective
Potential Experience Potential Experience
1–20 yrs 21–40 yrs Total 1–20 yrs 21–40 yrs Total
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 44.1% 13.4% 57.6%
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 56.2% 4.0% 60.3%
High 36.3% 6.2% 42.5% High 34.1% 5.6% 39.7%
Total 80.4% 19.6% Total 90.3% 9.7%
B: United Kingdom (UK LFS, years 2003-2005)
Observed Effective
Potential Experience Potential Experience
1–20 yrs  21–40 yrs Total 1–20 yrs 21–40 yrs Total
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 24.1% 6.2% 30.3%
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 71.3% 4.1% 75.4%
High 62.7% 7.0% 69.7% High 21.7% 2.9% 24.6%
Total 86.8% 13.2% Total 93.0% 7.0%
C: Germany (IABS, year 2000)
Observed Effective
Potential Experience Potential Experience
1–20 yrs 21–40 yrs Total 1–20 yrs 21–40 yrs Total
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 36.3% 6.2% 42.5%
Ed
uc
at
io
n Low 61.9% 0.0% 61.9%
High 51.4% 6.1% 57.5% High 35.8% 2.3% 38.1%
Total 87.7% 12.3% Total 97.7% 2.3%
Source: US Census 2000, UK Labor Force Survey 2003–2005, and IABS 2000.
Note: The table reports the observed distribution of recent immigrants (those who arrived within the 
last two years) across education-experience cells, as well as their imputed distribution based on effective 
skills. The imputation of effective skills is based on the distribution of workers across wage centiles and 
2-digit occupations, as described in section 4.1 of the online Appendix. 
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Interpretation of Relative and Total Effects of Immigration when Immigrants 
Downgrade
Downgrading may seriously bias the assessment of the wage and employment 
effects of immigration in the national skill-cell and in the mixture approaches, 
which rely on the pre-assignment of immigrants to education and experience cells, 
and then exploit variation in the relative density of immigrants across those skill 
groups. In contrast, the total effects of immigration obtained from the pure spatial 
approach is robust to the downgrading of immigrants and remains a policy-relevant 
parameter, addressing the question of how the overall immigration shock affects 
wages and employment of a particular skill group. Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 
(2013) emphasize that with this approach, the actual position of immigrants in the 
distribution of native skills is part of the estimated parameter. 
Mixture Approach. Downgrading leads to an overestimate of the true immigra-
tion shock to high-skilled natives and an underestimate of the true immigration 
shock to low-skilled natives. In the mixture approach, the direction of the bias due 
to downgrading is ambiguous in principle, and depends on whether the observed 
immigration shock is relatively low skilled or relatively high skilled. If, as it is the case 
in the US context, observed immigration is relatively low skilled, then downgrading 
will lead to an overstatement of the negative relative wage effect by education. In 
the US context, this type of bias is likely to be relatively small, since downgrading by 
education is, in contrast to downgrading by experience, small.
National skill-cell approach. Downgrading also leads to a bias in the estimates 
obtained from the national skill-cell approach. The direction of the bias is 
ambiguous in principle, and depends on the relative importance of the observed 
education-experience immigration shocks. In Figure 2, we plot the bias factor from 
downgrading against the degree of downgrading by education, where 0 refers to no 
downgrading and 0.5 refers to the case where 50 percent of high-skilled immigrants 
actually work in low-skilled jobs. In the figure, we assume for simplicity that the 
degree of downgrading by experience is the same for high- and low-skilled immi-
grants, and depict the bias factor for varying degrees of downgrading by experience 
(no downgrading, 30 percent downgrading, and 60 percent downgrading). The 
observed education-experience immigration shocks are computed from the 2000 
US Census based on immigrants who entered the United States in the past two 
years.5 The figure illustrates that over this time period in the United States, the 
bias factor exceeds one—implying an overstatement of the negative relative wage 
effect—and, depending on the degrees of downgrading, the bias factor can be very 
large. In the companion appendix to the paper, we show that based on the 2000 
US Census data, reasonable estimates for the degree of downgrading by education 
5 In this time period, the observed education-experience specific immigration shock  Δ  I ga   was at 0.0225 
largest for low-skilled inexperienced natives (workers with 20 or less years of potential experience who 
did not attend college), and at 0.0026 smallest for high-skilled experienced natives. High-skilled inexpe-
rienced natives experienced a somewhat larger immigration shock than low-skilled experienced natives 
( Δ  I HI = 0.0113 and  Δ  I LE = 0.0073). 
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and by experience are 0.09 and 0.54, respectively. Such degrees of downgrading 
suggest a bias factor of more than 2—implying that the “true” relative effect by 
experience, were we able to correctly assign immigrants to skill cells, is less than 
half of the estimated effect. Because in the US context, downgrading by experience 
exceeds downgrading by education, the bias from downgrading will be larger in the 
skill cell than in the mixture approach. Downgrading therefore provides an alterna-
tive explanation as to why the national skill-cell approach typically produces more 
negative wages effects of immigration than the mixture approach. Furthermore, as 
the degree of downgrading declines with time in the host country, any bias from 
downgrading will be larger when annual rather than decadal Census data are used 
for estimation. 
Structural Models and Substitutability between Immigrants and Natives
A more structural approach is to estimate the underlying parameters of the 
canonical model above and to use that model to predict the wage effects of immi-
gration. Using this approach, resulting estimates obviously rely on strong structural 
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Degree of Downgrading by Education
No downgrading by experience
30% downgrading by experience
60% downgrading by experience
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Figure 2 
Illustration of the Bias in the National Skill Cell Approach when Immigrants 
Downgrade
Source: Authors using data from the 2000 US Census.
Note: The figure illustrates the bias that may arise in estimates of the relative wage effect by experience of 
immigration obtained by the national skill cell approach when immigrants downgrade. The figure plots 
the bias factor against the degree of downgrading by education, for three degrees of downgrading by 
experience (0, 30 percent and 60 percent). For example, a bias factor of 2 implies that the estimated effect 
based on the observed skill-specific immigration shock is twice as large as the true effect that we would 
obtain if we could correctly assign immigrants to skill cells. The observed shocks to each education and 
experience group are drawn from the 2000 US Census. See section 4.2 of the online appendix for details. 
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assumptions that are far more stringent than those imposed by the empirical litera-
ture discussed so far. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) offer an early application of 
this approach. More recently, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning, 
and Wadsworth (2012) extend this approach to more flexible production functions 
but maintain the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Llull (2013) and Piyapromdee 
(2015) relax this assumption and model labor supply choices. 
Here, we will focus on Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning, 
and Wadsworth (2012). These two studies report positive wage effects of immigra-
tion for natives. For example, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) predict the long-run total 
wage effect (assuming fully elastic capital) of immigration on native workers to be 
0.6 percent over the period 1990 to 2006 in the United States. Scaled by its impact 
on total labor supply (an increase of 11.4 percent), this estimate suggest that a 
one-percent increase in labor supply by immigration increases the wage of native 
workers by 0.05 percent (see bottom panel of Table 1). By contrast, previous immi-
grants suffer a substantial wage loss (–0.6 percent).
Both studies impose a production technology similar to the one described 
above, but allow immigrants and natives to be imperfect substitutes within each 
education-experience cell. If immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes 
within education-experience groups, and mostly low-skilled inexperienced immi-
grants enter the labor market, then the incumbent low-skilled inexperienced 
immigrants will bear most of the burden of increased immigration—the more so 
the less substitutable immigrants and natives are within skill cells. In contrast, wages 
of not only high-skilled experienced natives, but also of low-skilled inexperienced 
natives may increase in response to immigration if immigrants and natives are not 
very substitutable within education-experience groups. These arguments highlight 
that the crucial parameter underlying the predicted total wage effects of immigra-
tion is the estimated elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives within 
education-experience cells. 
Both Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 
(2012) estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives by 
relating the relative wage changes of immigrants and natives observed in a particular 
skill cell to the respective relative employment changes. The two studies report esti-
mates of the elasticity of substitution of about 20 (from Ottaviano and Peri 2012) 
and 7 (from Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2012). But these estimates may 
be seriously impaired by the downgrading and thus misclassification of immigrants 
across skill cells, as Dustmann and Preston (2012) discuss in detail. This bias may 
increase further if wage changes of immigrants between two time periods not only 
reflect wage changes of existing immigrants in response to immigration, but also 
differences in wages between existing and entering immigrants within education and 
experience groups (Ruist 2013). If the estimates for the degree of substitutability 
between immigrants and natives are biased, then this will cause the estimates of the 
total and relative effects of immigration as predicted by the structure of the model to 
be biased—even if the model is correctly specified. In principle, the direction of the 
bias in the estimates for the elasticity of substitution between immigrant and natives 
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is ambiguous. Based on the observed immigration shocks in the US context, down-
grading is likely to lead to an overstatement of the negative (relative) wage responses 
of natives in the mixture and especially the skill-cell approach, but to an understate-
ment of the (total) wage responses of natives in the structural approach.6 
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we revisit the question of why different studies on the effects of 
immigration on wages come to different conclusions, and why there is continued 
controversy in this debate. We classify the existing empirical studies that estimate wage 
effects of immigration in three types: studies that use variation in immigrant inflows 
across education-experience cells at the national level, as for example in Borjas 
(2003), studies that exploit variation in the total immigrant inflow across regions, 
as for example in Altonji and Card (1991), and studies that use variation in immi-
grant flows both across regions and across educations groups, as for example in Card 
(2001). We show that these three approaches identify different and not comparable 
parameters, which is one important reason for the continued controversy of the wage 
effects of immigration in the existing literature. While the national skill-cell approach 
identifies the effect of immigration on one experience group versus another within 
education groups, the mixture approach identifies the relative effect of immigra-
tion of one education group versus another. By contrast, the pure spatial approach 
recovers the total effect of immigration, which, unlike the first two approaches, takes 
into account complementarities across skill cells and across capital and labor.
We then relax the maintained assumption in much of the existing literature 
that native labor supply is either inelastic, or equally elastic across different skill 
groups. We show that in the presence of labor response heterogeneity, estimated 
relative wage effects of immigration from the national skill-cell approach yield 
misleading and hard-to-interpret estimates of the overall labor market impact of 
immigration. In contrast, estimates of total effects of immigration retain a clear 
interpretation, and remain meaningful and policy relevant. Employment and wage 
effects, however, need to be studied jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the 
overall labor market effect of immigration.
We finally discuss the possibility that immigrants “downgrade” and work in jobs 
below their observed education and experience level, and argue that downgrading 
will lead to biased estimates in the national skill-cell and mixture approaches, which 
both rely on variation of immigration inflows across skill cells.
6 In the companion appendix to this paper, we provide, focusing on the high-skilled experienced group 
and observed immigration inflows in the United States, an example in which downgrading leads to 
an overestimate of the degree of substitutability between immigrants and natives–which will understate 
wage losses for the low-skilled inexperienced natives most exposed to immigration, overstate possible 
wage gains for the high-skilled experienced natives least exposed to immigration, and overstate the wage 
losses of previous immigrants.
Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönberg, and Jan Stuhler     53
Although the bias from downgrading generally cannot be signed, we illustrate 
that in the US context it may severely overstate the negative relative wage effect by 
experience in the national-cell approach. Downgrading is also likely to overstate 
the negative relative wage effect by education estimated by the mixture approach, 
but in the US context the bias is likely to be smaller than in the national skill-cell 
approach—which may be one reason why the mixture approach tends to produce 
less-negative wage effects than the national skill-cell approach. By contrast, the total 
effect of immigration identified by the pure spatial approach is robust to down-
grading, as there is no need to assign immigrants to skill cells.
We further point out that downgrading poses a problem for structural 
approaches that allow immigrants and natives to be imperfect substitutes within 
education-experience groups, and we calculate relative and total effects of immigra-
tion based on estimated parameters and the structure of the model, as for example 
in Ottaviano and Perio (2012) and Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012). 
Specifically, we show that in the presence of downgrading, immigrants and natives 
may appear to be imperfect substitutes within skill cells even though they are not. As 
such, downgrading will cause us to understate the wage losses of native workers, even 
if the model is correctly specified—which may help to explain why the structural 
approach typically produces positive (total) wage effects of immigration for natives.
In sum, we advocate that researchers exploit variation in the overall immigra-
tion shock for the identification of the total labor market effects of immigration. 
Not only does this approach identify a meaningful and policy relevant parameter, 
but it is also robust to heterogeneous labor supply elasticities across skill groups and 
the downgrading of immigrants. 
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